Analaysis of I think therefore I Err Epistemology cognition Essay

Analaysis of I think therefore I Err Epistemology cognition - Essay ExampleOn the other mountain, the last mentioned is what is deemed as necessary and beneficial to the development of a given intelligent system. These good errors serve a functional role in the development of knowledge and, in turn, intelligence. It is in this regard that Gigerenzer makes the study of compassionate being errors in experimental psychology as his primary concern in inferring the laws of cognition (1). In his study, Gigerenzer defends an ecological system versus that of a logical analysis of cognitive errors. In doing so, he claims that a proper analysis should not be based content-blind logical conventions. Upon addressing the aforementioned problem, I shall deal with Gigerenzers analysis of the role of logic with regards to the workings of the human heading and intelligence. Specifically, I shall focus on his claim on logic as a content-blind norm for good reasoning (7). Herein, I shall argue t hat his analysis of the role of logic as a purely syntactic and content-blind theory is mistaken. Like Daniel Kahneman and Amon Tversky, I agree that not all judgments basis be analyzed by using empirical methods much(prenominal)(prenominal) as sampling and frequency estimates, for such are unlikely to illuminate the processes that underlie such judgments (589). Rather, I shall argue that Gigerenzer overlooks an important aspect of logic, that is, the intensional aspect of logic. By doing so, I shall focus on his explication of framing and invariance. In this essay, I intend to uphold the value of logic from an intensional point of view. In doing so, I shall show that Gigerenzer fails to prove that the study of cognitive errors in the light of logical forms of analyses fail to unravel the laws of mind. Summary In a section entitled, system of logic and Blunders, Gigerenzer argues against the position of using logical theories as a foundation for analyzing and comparing the prese nce of errors in judgment, and thus, fails to lay out what really errors of judgment are, as well as to open a window into the human mind (4). In other words, logic does not help us understand and gain intelligence by pointing out our errors in judgment, rather it blurs our understanding of what these errors really are, and thus, fails to open the possibility for progress and evolution of the human mind as an intelligent system. Given this perspective, Gigerenzer provides an example in logic to support his point, namely, framing. Framing is delimitate as the expression of logically equivalent information in different ways (Gigerenzer 7). Similarly, according to the commandment of invariance, different representations of the same choice problem should yield the same preference. That is, the preference between options should be unaffiliated of their description (Gigerenzer 8). Thus, if different representations of the same choice problem yield different preferences, then it violat es rational choice. much(prenominal) violations are deemed as errors in judgment that should not happen to any rational person. Gigerenzer gives the example of ii ways of saying the following The glass is half full, and the glass is half empty (8). Given the principle of invariance, these two formulations should not affect the choice of the person in picking which glass to hand over. However, it was shown that when asked to hand over the half full glass, most participants picked the previously empty one (Gigerenzer 8). The author then claims that such an example proves to show that two